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Abstract
This paper investigates whether an increase in the international price of diamonds
impacts violent activity in African countries that are diamond abundant and if so,
through which mechanism(s). It concludes that an increase in the diamond price is pos-
itively related to violence in countries abundant in primary diamonds, but unrelated to
violence in countries with secondary diamonds. This result makes it possible to distin-
guish between two potential theoretical mechanisms connecting resources and violence:
insecure property rights raising the returns to conflict and the wage rate changing the
opportunity costs of conflict. The findings support the latter, but not the former. Re-
sults are robust to using different diamond prices, instrumenting for diamond price and
controlling for cyclical effects, but not to controlling for the presence of other resources.
1 Introduction
“For every hand taken in marriage, another hand is taken away”. This slogan accom-
panies an internet advertisement featuring a black hand, cut off at the wrist, wearing a
diamond ring.1 It speaks to the idea that diamond production and/or trade cause conflict,
violence and human suffering. The international community seems to have endorsed this
idea as well: in 2003 the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme entered into force, requir-
ing signatory countries to ensure that all shipments of diamonds in and out of the country
are accompanied by a certificate stating that these are not ‘conflict diamonds’, rough dia-
monds used by rebel movements to finance conflict against legitimate governments. This
paper aims to examine the proposed link between diamonds and conflict, by investigating
whether and through which mechanism(s) variation in the international price of diamonds
is related to violent activity in diamond-abundant areas.
∗Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political Science. Contact:
a.s.rigterink@lse.ac.uk. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds, The
Netherlands
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Research on diamonds and conflict is part of a larger literature on resources and civil
war, results of which are inconclusive on a number of fronts. Taking ‘natural resources’
as a single category, an often used method is to run a logit regression with a dummy
variable for conflict onset or occurrence in a country-period as a dependent, and resource
exports as a percentage of GDP as one of the explanatory variables. Employing this type of
analysis, Collier and Hoeffler conclude in a number of papers (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998,
2004; Collier et al., 2009) that natural resource exports and war risk are positively related.
However, other authors fail to find similar results. Natural resources exports over GDP does
not enter significantly in the model by Fearon and Laitin (2003), who argue that Collier and
Hoeffler’s results are an artefact of their use of five-year periods as unit of analysis, coding
of ongoing wars and list-wise deletion of missing data. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002)
reach similar conclusions. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) run a large number of regressions,
systematically including all possible combinations of 88 potential explanatory variables and
conclude that the relationship between resource exports and civil conflict is not robust.
Other research focuses on the relationship between specific resources and conflict, esti-
mating similar models but replacing natural resource exports over GDP with various indi-
cators for oil and diamond export and/or production. Three studies focussing on diamonds
are especially relevant to this paper. All three use the Fearon and Laitin (2003) data as a
starting point.
First, Lujala et al. (2005) construct a database, DIADATA, including known instances of
diamond occurrence, date of discovery and date of first production. The data distinguishes
between primary diamonds (extracted in technologically advanced mines) and secondary
diamonds (which can be extracted using more artisanal techniques). Using DIADATA,
Lujala et al. create several dummies for the occurrence and production of primary and
secondary diamonds. They find no effect of production of either diamond type on war risk
in general, but conclude that secondary diamond production increases the chance of ethnic
war onset and occurrence. Primary diamond production is unrelated to conflict, as is the
occurrence of both primary and secondary diamonds.
Secondly, Humphreys (2005) collects data on the quantities of diamonds mined (with-
out distinguishing between secondary and primary diamonds). He concludes diamond
production increases the risk of war onset, but decreases the duration of conflict.
Finally, Ross (2006) augments Humphreys’ dataset on the quantities of diamonds pro-
duced and calculates its $ value using the country-specific diamond price, extrapolated
back using a diamond price index. He multiplies the values with the Lujala et al. (2005)
et al. dummies for primary and secondary diamond production to arrive at indicators for
the value of primary and secondary diamond production. In contrast to Lujala et al., Ross
finds that primary diamonds are positively related to the onset of civil, national, ethnic and
non-ethnic conflict. Secondary diamonds are unrelated, except to separatist conflict, and
both are unrelated to conflict duration.
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As is clear from the above, the jury is still out on the question whether resources and
war risk are systematically related. Even if such a relationship were established questions
remain as to whether this is a causal relationship and the mechanism through which they
are related.
Drawing convincing causal conclusions is extremely difficult because the above studies
exploit cross-country variation in the occurrence of war and resource production, and there
may be any number of country-specific factors jointly determining both. Furthermore,
exports and production of resources may be endogenous to violence. This problem is
especially pressing when using natural resource exports over GDP, as GDP may decline
more steeply than natural resource exports in anticipation of conflict, leaving open the
possibility that the ratio between the two increases as a result of conflict rather than the
other way around. However, measures based on natural resource production are not free of
endogeneity issues. It is not hard to imagine that actual or measured resource production
responds to (the threat of) conflict. More formally, the theoretical models employed in
this paper suggest that production and export of natural resources increase as a result of
conflict. Indeed there is evidence that the observed relationship between resources and
civil war disappears when using more exogenous measures of resource abundance (see for
example Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Rigterink, 2010).
As for the mechanisms that link natural resources and conflict: there is no shortage of
suggestions as to how they are related (some authors even speak of an ‘embarrassment
of mechanisms’ (Humphreys, 2005)) but again little definitive evidence. Natural resources
may increase the opportunities to make money during war, increase the value of trying to
capture the state, weaken state accountability, lower economic growth or spur grievances
among the population (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2004). Despite
the many suggestions, very few formal models existed predicting the impact of natural
resources on the incentive to wage conflict until recently. Formal models are deemed es-
sential, to describe the mechanisms linking resources and conflict more accurately and to
guide the choice of variables to be included in empirical research.
Because of the above issues, there has been a call for more theoretical models and empir-
ical research exploiting within-country variation, based on formal theoretical models and
employing exogenous measures of research abundance (see for example Besley and Pers-
son, 2008; Blattman and Miquel, 2009). A number of studies of this type will be highlighted
in the next section. This paper intends to contribute to this body of research by focussing
on diamonds and violence. Diamonds feature prominently in the international policy scene
and the distinction between primary and secondary diamonds will prove interesting in dis-
tinguishing between different mechanisms that could theoretically connect resources and
war, but to the best of my knowledge, the relationship between diamonds and violence has
not yet been investigated exploiting within-country variation.
This paper will first introduce two theoretical models on the relationship between re-
sources and conflict. One (Garfinkel et al., 2008) formalizes the idea that natural resources
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increase the returns to violence, as they can be valuable assets easily expropriated (de-
pending on the security of property rights). It predicts that as the international price of a
contested resource increases, conflict activity in regions abundant in this resource increases.
A second model (Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2004) arrives at a similar prediction, but through a dif-
ferent mechanism. It poses that natural resources may decrease the costs of waging conflict.
As the price of a natural resource with a capital intensive production process increases, the
returns to labour and thereby the opportunity costs of waging conflict decrease in countries
producing this resource. Since neither of the models includes a government, a third model
(Besley and Persson, 2008) will be briefly introduced.
The predictions of the two main models are especially interesting in the case of dia-
monds. Primary diamonds are associated with a capital-intensive production process and
relatively secure property rights, while the property rights of secondary diamonds can more
easily be contested and production is labour-intensive. Therefore, the model by Garfinkel
et al. (2008) predicts that secondary diamond price is more strongly related to conflict than
primary diamond price, while the model by Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2004) asserts that increases
in primary diamond price would increase conflict activity whilst an increase in secondary
diamonds decreases it. By investigating the effect of primary and secondary diamond price
on violent activity, we can get an idea about the mechanism connecting diamonds and con-
flict: weak property rights increasing the returns to conflict or low wages decreasing its
costs.
A barrier to investigating the impact of diamonds on conflict is the unreliability of
diamond export data. As diamonds are so easily smuggled, any data on diamonds in a
conflict zone should be treated with suspicion. Furthermore, as highlighted earlier, both
models suggest diamond export and production are endogenous to conflict. Therefore, I
use geographical data to estimate predicted primary and secondary diamond abundance
for 48 African countries, arguing that geographical data are exogenous to conflict and more
reliable than diamond export or production data.
In a fixed effects model, these measures of primary and secondary diamond abundance
are then interacted with international diamond price, to investigate whether higher dia-
mond price is associated with more conflict events in countries that are more diamond
abundant. In this analysis, primary diamonds are positively related to conflict activity,
while secondary diamonds are insignificant, yet consistently enter the regressions with a
negative sign. This lends support to the Dal Bó and Dal Bó model, emphasizing the costs
of conflict in terms of wages as a mechanism connecting resources and conflict, although
an alternative explanation using the Besley and Persson (2008) model will also be consid-
ered. The results are reasonably robust to changing the measure of diamond price used,
controlling for seasonal effects and instrumenting for diamond price using the production
volume of the largest, peaceful diamond producers. They are not robust to controlling for
the presence of other resources.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the theoretical
models, section 3 describes the methodology, measure of diamond abundance and other
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data used, section 4 presents the main results and section 5 will go into the robustness of
the results, before concluding.
2 Theoretical models
2.1 Garfinkel et al.: property rights and returns to conflict
Garfinkel et al. (2008) construct a model suggesting that an increase in price of natural
resources leads to an increase in conflict when the property rights of (a fraction of the avail-
able) natural resources are contested, because an increase in the resource price increases the
returns to conflict.
The model describes a country with N equally sized groups, indexed by i. All groups
are endowed with an equal amount of land (T) and labour (L), property rights to which
cannot be contested. Groups can use land to produce oil (Oi), labour can be allocated to
producing butter (Bi) or to producing guns (Gi), all on a one-to-one basis. This makes the
production of butter: max[L− Gi, 0]. The sum of guns produced over all groups is denoted
by G¯. p denotes the price of oil relative to the price of butter. The prices of butter, guns
and labour are normalized to 1. Under free trade, the price of oil is exogenously set by the
world market (the country can be considered ’small’) and all goods including guns can be
traded freely.
There is some amount of land T0, property rights to which are contested by the groups
in a winner-takes-all fashion. The more guns a group produces, the higher the probability
it will obtain this land (pii):
pii =

Gi
G¯ if G¯ > 0
1
N otherwise
Groups consume both oil and butter and have Cobb-Douglas preferences:
Ui(Oi, Bi) = (Oi)α(Bi)β (1)
where αe[0, 1] and α+ β = 1.
Timing in this model is as follows: (1) groups allocate their labour to butter and gun
production, taking other groups’ gun choices as given; (2) given the gun choices, one group
obtains T0. Expected total land endowment for group after this contest is denoted by T˜i.
Total land endowment after conflict for any group is either T or T + T0; (3) production,
trade and consumption takes place.
Solving by backward induction gives the following. Given T˜i each group maximizes (1)
subject to budget constraint:
pOi + Bi ≤ pT˜i + L− Gi
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It can be shown that at the optimum, expected pay-off for group i (Wi) is:
Wi(G, p) = µ(p)(p(T + piiT0) + L− Gi) (2)
where µ(p) = ββ(α/p)α and bearing in mind T˜i = T + piiT0.
Differentiating (2) with respect to Gi gives the optimal gun production (which is the
same for all groups because they are a priori identical):
G∗i =
(N − 1)pT0
N2
(3)
The result from (3) is that gun production increases in the price of the contested resource
(p), given that some contested resources are present (T0 6= 0). The intuition for this is that as
the contested resource increases in value, the expected returns to investing in guns increase.
Gun production also increases in amount of contested land.
Garfinkel et al. (2008) also show that the excess demand for the contested resource is
decreasing in the degree of property rights insecurity. This implies that a country would
export more (import less) of the contested resource under conflict compared to a non-
conflict benchmark. It suggests we cannot treat a countries’ resource exports as exogenous
to conflict.
2.2 Dal Bó and Dal Bó: wages and the cost of conflict
The model by Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2004) suggests that an increase in the price of a natural
resource with a capital intensive production process increases conflict in countries where
this resource is produced, whilst an increase in the price of a labour intensive resource
decreases conflict in a producing country. This arises because the price increase (decrease),
decreases (increases) the returns to labour and thereby the opportunity costs of conflict.
Dal Bó and Dal Bó construct a Stolper-Samuelson type model of a country with two
productive sectors: sector 1 is capital intensive and sector 2 is labour intensive. In addition
to the productive sectors, there is an expropriation sector (denoted by subscript A). Pro-
duction in both productive sectors is q1 and q2 respectively. The price of good 1 relative to
the price of good 2 is p and the price of good 2 is normalized to 1. Prices are exogenously
determined by the world market (again, the country can be considered small). The country
is endowed with fixed amounts of labour (L¯) and capital (K¯). Prices of capital and labour
(before expropriation) are r and w respectively. Productivity in both sectors is indicated by
aij, the amount of input j used to produce one unit of output in sector i. Because of the
factor intensities of both sectors:
a1K
a2L
<
a1K
a2L
(4)
The expropriation sector uses only labour as an input (LA is the amount of labour allocated
to this sector). It expropriates a fraction A(LA) of the production of both productive sectors,
where A(LA) is a continuous and concave function.
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In equilibrium, a number of conditions must be satisfied. Under the assumption of
perfect competition, firms earn zero profits:
ra1K + wa1L = p (5)
ra2K + wa2L = 1 (6)
Furthermore, the markets for production factors clear:
q1a1K + q2a2K = K¯ (7)
q1a1L + q2a2L = L¯− LA (8)
Finally, returns to labour in the expropriation sector and productive sectors must be equal.
The return to labour in the expropriation sector is the value of the share of total production
expropriated, per unit of labour. Under constant returns to scale, the value of total pro-
duction equals the payments to the factors employed in the productive sector. The return
to labour in the production sector is the share of the wage that is left to the worker after
expropriation. This makes the final condition:
A(LA)
LA
(rK¯ + w(L¯− LA)) = (1− A(LA))w (9)
In absence of full specialization, the implications of this model are as follows. Using
(5) and (6), we can write r and w as a function fo p. Differentiating with respect to p and
bearing in mind (4), it can be shown that dwdp < 0 and
dr
dp > 0, implying that an increase
in the price of the capital intensive output leads to a decrease in the wage and an increase
in the price of capital. Intuitively, as the price of the capital intensive good increases, the
capital intensive sector expands and the labour intensive sector shrinks. Not all labour
freed up from the labour intensive sector can be rehired in the capital intensive sector at
the same factor prices, as labour is relatively less productive in the latter sector, and wages
decrease.
To examine the effect of an increase in the price of the capital intensive output on the
size of the expropriation sector (measured by LA), (9) can be written as:
A(LA) =
1
r
w K¯ + L¯
LA
From the implicit function theorem, we know that that it is possible to express LA as a
function of p. Differentiating this function with respect to p, we obtain:
dLA
dp
= −
K¯LA
( rw K¯+L¯)
2
d( rw )
dp
A′ − 1r
w K¯+L¯
which can be shown to be positive, as d
r
w
dp > 0 and A is concave. The result of this model is
that conflict (as measured by the size of the expropriation sector) increases with the price
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of the capital intensive resource. Conversely, conflict decreases in the price of the labour
intensive resource.
Intuitively, as the price of the capital intensive resource increases, wages in the produc-
tive sector go down, decreasing the opportunity costs of allocating labour to the expropria-
tion sector compared to the total value of production that can potentially be expropriated.
Using (7) and (8) it is possible to write q1 and q2 as a function of LA and show that the
production of the capital intensive good increases in the size of the expropriation sector,
whilst production in the labour intensive sector decreases in LA. Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2004)
remark that the endogeneity of production to expropriation poses a challenge to empirical
research attempting to estimate the impact of natural resources on conflict.
This model is tested in the context of Columbia by Dube and Vargas (2009), using an
empirical set-up similar to the one employed in this paper. They investigate the impact of
variation in the international prices of coffee (a resource they assume to be labour intensive)
and oil (capital intensive) on the intensity of violence in oil and coffee producing districts of
Columbia. They find that the interaction between international coffee price and a dummy
indicating a coffee-producing district is negatively related to conflict intensity, while the
interaction between oil price and an oil-producer dummy is positively related to violence.
This result is robust to instrumenting for the oil and coffee-producer dummy using climatic
variables and to instrumenting for coffee price using the export volume of other large coffee
producers.
2.3 Besley and Persson: the ‘prize’ of government and the returns to conflict
As neither of the above models contains a government, this section will briefly describe
a model that does, by Besley and Persson (2008). It predicts that an increase in the export
price of natural resources increases conflict over government, because it increases the value
of being the incumbent.
Besley and Persson model a country with two groups of equal size, living for various
periods. At the start of each period, one group is the incumbent and the other the op-
position. Timing is roughly as follows. (1) The value of natural resource rents that the
incumbent group will receive at the end of the period is exogenously determined. (2) Both
groups choose the size of their army. Costs of an army consist exclusively of labour costs.
The incumbent can use public funds to finance the army; the opposition must tax its own
group. (3) The incumbent group stays in power with some probability. This probability de-
creases in the size of the opposision army and increases in the size of the incumbent army.
(4) The winning group determines policies; how natural resource rents are spent. The ad-
vantage of being the incumbent is that this group could possibly transfer more to itself than
to the opposition group. The extent to which this is possible is constraint by institutions:
the ‘best’ institutions require transfers to the incumbent’s group and the opposition group
to be equal. (5) Payoffs are realized.
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When choosing a level of armament, groups maximize their own-group expected payoff.
Intuitively, groups choose to arm when the advantage of being the incumbent weighted by
the probability of obtaining government power given the size of the army, outweighs the
costs of raising such an army. This will happen at a lower level of ‘incumbent advantage’ for
the original incumbent: it has a cost advantage in arming because it can use public funds
to pay for the army. Therefore, three situations are possible: no group decides to raise an
army (peace), only the incumbent raises an army (repression) or both groups arm (civil
war). Since the ‘incumbent advantage’ depends positively on the flow of resource income
and negatively on the quality of institutions, the chance of conflict increases in the export
price of natural resources and decreases in the quality of institutions. Besley and Persson
conclude furthermore that the chance of conflict increases in the price of natural resources
imported, as this decreases the wage rate and thereby the costs of raising an army.
Besley and Persson (2008) test their theoretical model in the same paper. Using a model
with time- and country-fixed effects, they find that country-specific export and import
prices of natural resources are indeed related to the incidence of conflict. Disaggregating
resource prices, it seems that this result is driven by agricultural products’ export and im-
port prices and mineral and oil import prices. Mineral and oil export prices are not related
to conflict incidence. Besley and Persson fail to find similar results in a cross-country set-
ting, which they conclude is unsurprising given the problems associated with cross-country
analyses.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Diamonds: some geology, predictions and data
In light of the previous sections, diamonds are an interesting resource to investigate
for two reasons. First, the distinction between primary and secondary diamonds enables
testing empirically the mechanisms connecting resources and war identified by Dal Bó and
Dal Bó (2004) and Garfinkel et al. (2008), as their models make opposite predictions on
whether primary or secondary diamonds are positively related to conflict. Secondly, dia-
monds are found according to geological regularities, making it possible to use geological
data to construct an exogenous measure of diamond abundance. Some geology of dia-
monds will illustrate both points.
Diamonds were formed deep beneath the earth’s surface in the early phases of earth for-
mation, over 1500 million years ago. They are transported to minable depths by two much
younger types of ‘host rock’, kimberlite and lamproite. Between formation and transporta-
tion, tectonic activity has reformed large regions of the earth, destroying the diamonds in
the process. Diamond have survived only in geological areas that have been stable for the
last 1500 million years, a regularity that has become known as ‘Cliffords rule’ (Clifford,
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1966) (validity of which has been confirmed more recently by Janse and Sheahan (1995)).
Minable primary diamond deposits are thus likely to occur where such a surviving source
of diamonds and a transport medium (kimberlite or lamproite host rock) coincide (Helm-
staedt and Gurney, 1995). Primary diamonds can be mined directly from kimberlite and
lamproite pipes, which involves excavating and crushing large section of host rock to extract
the diamonds. The production process of primary diamonds can therefore be considered
capital-intensive. Because kimberlite and lamproite occur in pipes with a relatively small
diameter (a few hundred meters to a kilometre) property rights over a primary diamonds
are relatively easy to protect, at least compared to secondary diamonds.
Secondary diamonds are eroded and moved away from the host rock by rivers, sea,
wind or a glacier. The latter two are of little importance to this research: there is only one
economically viable aeolian diamond deposit (in Namibia) and glacial deposits are only of
scientific interest (Marshall and Baxter-Brown, 1995). Viable deposits of diamond can be
found as far away as 600 km from the original source. Although it may seem intuitive, it
is not the case that deposits closer to the source are necessarily most interesting economi-
cally. Diamonds found do decrease in size further away from the source, but their quality
increases as inferior diamonds get destroyed during transport and the diamonds are more
rounded leading to less weight loss during the cutting process (Sutherland, 1982). Further-
more, the diamond grade of the deposit is at least as important as the quality and size of
individual diamonds. ‘Trap sites’ (often in river bends with a hard bedrock), where rela-
tively large amounts of diamonds are concentrated are most interesting to exploit. An ideal
site is one where a young river samples an older river bed, sorting the diamonds further
from other stones. On balance, the most economically significant deposits are found off-
craton (outside the zones Clifford identifies) and secondary diamond deposits need not be
close to a viable primary source (Marshall and Baxter-Brown, 1995). Secondary diamonds
can be extracted with very basic means, manually sorting ordinary stones from diamonds.
As they are often found in rivers spread over a relatively large territory, secondary di-
amonds display some characteristics of an open access resource and property rights are
hard to protect. As Marshall and Baxter-Brown (1995) put it: “alluvial diamond mining is
the preserve of the individual digger, or small private company or operator”.
Thus, we have capital intensive primary diamonds with relatively secure property rights
and labour intensive secondary diamonds with insecure property rights. According to
the theoretical framework by Garfinkel et al. (2008), who emphasize the ‘contestedness’ of
resources as a mechanism, the value of secondary diamonds would be related to conflict
intensity, but primary diamond price less so. In contrast, the model by Dal Bó and Dal Bó
(2004), in which the capital or labour intensiveness of the production process is central,
predicts that primary diamond price is positively related to the intensity of violence, whilst
secondary diamond price is negatively related. This provides a clear way to distinguish
between the mechanisms both models identify.
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The geological regularities in where diamonds are found can be used to construct an
exogenous measure of diamond abundance. To predict an area’s abundance in primary
diamonds, I use the CONSOREM database of all know world kimberlite and lamproite
occurrences (Faure, 2006) and information on the age of the bedrock compiled by the Geo-
logical Survey of Canada (GSC) (Chorlton, 2007). I select those areas older than 15 million
years2, as suggested by Clifford and then select those kimberlite or lamproite deposits that
coincide with these regions. The number of these intersections in a given country is the
measure of primary diamond abundance used. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 1,
along with the Lujala et al. (2005) locations of ‘non-lootable’ diamond production.
Figure 1: Primary diamond abundance
Area stable for last 1500 milion years
Kimberlite/lamproite deposit 
estimated non-diamondiferous
Kimberlite/lamproite deposit 
estimated diamondiferous
‘Non-lootable’ diamond önd
Lujala et al. (2005)
As we can see, there is considerable overlap, making it reasonable to believe that the
measure constructed indeed captures primary diamond abundance. Eighteen African coun-
2Areas classified by GSC as of an age between eo-Archean and Pealeo-Mesoproterozoic.
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tries3 are classified as having some primary diamonds, which is in congruence with geo-
logical knowledge (Janse and Sheahan (1995) list 16 countries where primary diamonds
occur).
To measure secondary diamond abundance, one would ideally want to have information
on erosion channels since the formation of kimberlite and lamproite. Unfortunately, this is
not available. Data on modern rivers does exist (Global Runoff Data Centre, 2007), although
modern rivers do not necessarily coincide with older ones. However, since we know how
far meaningful deposits of secondary diamonds can be removed from the source, and that
deposits are most concentrated where younger rivers sample old river beds, I employ the
following strategy. I select all sections of modern rivers that are within a 600 mile radius of a
predicted primary diamond source. The total length of all these segments in a given country
is a measure of secondary diamond abundance. Visually, this again coincides reasonably
within secondary diamond production (see Figure 2). This measure predicts 37 African
countries to have some secondary diamonds. This is more than Janse and Sheahan (1995)
record, which likely reflects both some inaccuracies in my secondary diamond measure
and the fact that secondary diamond finds are harder to record.
Table 1 shows that the constructed measures of diamond abundance are correlated rea-
sonably strongly with the dummy variables for primary and secondary diamond produc-
tion Lujala et al. (2005) use. Predicted secondary diamond abundance is significantly cor-
related with estimates of the total quantity of diamonds minded by Humphreys (2005), but
primary diamond abundance is not. This fact is not easily explained, especially since the
exact opposite applies to the Lujala et al. indicators for primary and secondary diamonds.
To sum up, there is considerable evidence that the measures constructed indeed capture
primary and secondary diamond abundance. These measures will be used to test the
different predictions of the models by Dal Bó and Dal Bó and Garfinkel et al. described.
3.2 Methodology
I estimate the following model:
violencect = β1primc×pricet + β2secc×pricet + β3pricet + β4Xct + αc + εct (10)
where the dependent variable is the number of violent events in country c in period t (I ex-
periment with various period lengths, so the period may be a month, quarter or year), primc
and secc represent the predicted primary and secondary diamond abundance of country
c as described in section 3.1, pricet is the nominal price of diamonds on the international
market in period t and Xct is a vector of country-period specific control variables, always
including GDP per capita and population size and either the inflation level or exchange
rate of the national currency against the US $. The latter two are included because the
same nominal price of diamonds in dollars may provide a stronger incentive for conflict
3Angola, Boswana, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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Figure 2: Secondary diamond abundance
River section estimated 
diamondiferous
River section estimated non-
diamondiferous
Kimberlite/lamproite deposit 
estimated diamondiferous
‘Lootable’ diamond önd
Lujala et al. (2005)
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Table 1: Correlation coefficients for various measures of diamond abundance
Primary diamond Lujala et al. primary Humphreys quantity
abundance diamond dummy of diamonds mined
Primary diamond 1.0000
abundance
Lujala et al. primary 0.4297*** 1.0000
diamond dummy (0.0023)
Humphreys quantity -0.0216 0.3542** 1.0000
of diamonds mined (0.8866) (0.0157)
Second. diamond Lujala et al. second. Humphreys quantity
abundance diamond dummy of diamonds mined
Second. diamond 1.0000
abundance
Lujala et al. second. 0.4644*** 1.0000
diamond dummy (0.0009)
Humphreys quantity 0.5544*** 0.1393 1.0000
of diamonds mined (0.0001) (0.3559)
p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
For Lujala et al. and Humphreys data, values for the latest year available are used
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in a country with high inflation or a weak exchange rate. I include country-fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
This allows testing the hypotheses derived from the theoretical models in sections 2.1
and 2.2. The model by Garfinkel et al. suggests that β2 is larger than 0 and significant and
β1 is insignificant. By contrast, Dal Bó and Dal Bó’s model predicts β1 to be positive and
significant and β2 to be negative and significant.
Bearing the criticisms on earlier studies on diamonds and conflict in mind, I include
country-fixed effects, thereby using only within-country variation. This eliminates con-
cerns about country-specific time-invariant characteristics that may impact both diamond
abundance and violence. The use of an interaction term between diamond abundance and
diamond price mitigates concerns about time-specific factors driving both diamond price
and violence (the state of the world economy is an obvious one that comes to mind). Such
factors would only constitute a problem to the analysis if these influence the level of vio-
lence more strongly in diamond abundant countries than in countries without diamonds.
Intuitively, the analysis is analogous to examining the effect of a treatment (a change in
diamond price) on a treated group (those countries with diamonds) and a control group
(countries without diamonds).
3.3 Data
In addition to the indicators for diamond abundance, I use the following data. The
intensity of violence is measured by the number of violent events as recorded by the Armed
Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh and Hegre, 2005). This dataset
contains data conflict events in the period January 1997–July 2010, including the date of
occurrence and geographic location and distinguishes between eight types of events: (1)
violence against civilians; (2) battle - no change of territory; (3) battle - government regains
territory; (4) battle - rebels overtake territory; (5) riots/protests; (6) non-violent activity by a
conflict actor; (7) headquarters or base established; (8) non-violent transfer of territory. My
default indicator of the intensity of violence is the number of events of the first four types;
events six through eight are clearly not violent, and riots and protests not necessarily so.
Because one may or may not believe that riots and protests are driven by the same factors
as other types of violence, I also run some regressions including riots and protests in the
indicator for conflict intensity. Data on conflict events is only systematically available for
Africa, limiting the sample to African countries. This continent is also the largest single
producer of diamonds, amounting to over half of world production (Janse and Sheahan,
1995), making this limitation to the sample acceptable.
With regard to diamond prices, I would ideally like to have data on the price of rough
(unpolished) diamonds. However, the structure of the diamond market makes it extremely
difficult to obtain this data. The Central Selling Organisation (CSO), a branch of De Beers,
controls 75% of the market for rough diamonds and sales take place during non-public
‘sightings’ rather than through the open market, an altogether rather secretive process
15
(Saldern, 1992; Yoeli, 2003; Spar, 2006). Data on polished diamonds is publicly available.
Since rough diamonds are an important input in the production of polished diamonds, it
seems reasonable to use polished diamond prices as a proxy for rough diamond price in
the analysis. As a check, I also use the value per carat of rough diamond exports of the
countries signatory to the Kimberley process as an indicator of rough diamond price (which
is only available quarterly and for the period 2004 to 2009).
I obtain data on the market closing price of polished diamonds of different sizes (0.3 to 3
carats), colours and clarities through Datastream. Because I do not have an a priori reason to
believe that one particular type of diamond is most strongly associated with conflict or that
one type is representative of all diamonds in general, I use principal component analysis to
extract a common factor from all available diamond prices. This factor has an eigenvalue
of 8.3523 and it captures approximately 42% of variation in individual prices. A cursory
look at the factor weights suggests that the prices of larger diamonds (1-3 carats) receive
a larger weight than the price of smaller diamonds. The common factor thus obtained is
the indicator for diamond price used in the subsequent analysis. Alternatively, I use the
‘polished prices diamond price index’, also obtained through Datastream. However, since it
is unclear through what method the makers arrive at this index, this is not the main source
of data used. Data on diamond price is only available from 2002, limiting the research
period to January 2002-July 2010. Since Datastream provides data diamond price on a daily
basis, it is possible to calculate the average diamond price by month, quarter and year.
Data on GDP per capita in constant prices and on population size is taken from the
World Development Indicators and is recorded on a yearly basis. Consumer Price Index
(CPI) and exchange rate of the local currency to the US $ are taken from the IMF Interna-
tional Financial Statistics and Datastream respectively. The average per month, quarter and
year is either available or can be calculated using these sources.
4 Results
Table 2 displays the results of running regression (10), using the data described. Be-
cause I have no a priori beliefs about the time frame within which diamond price would
influence conflict activity, I use monthly, quarterly and yearly data in columns (1), (2) and
(3) respectively. In these regressions, the coefficient on the interaction between primary di-
amond abundance and diamond price is consistently significant and positive. By contrast,
the interaction term including secondary diamond abundance is not significantly related to
conflict activity and its coefficient has a negative sign in all regressions. This would indi-
cate that an increase in diamond price leads to an increase in violence in countries that are
abundant in primary diamonds, but does not affect (or if anything affects negatively) con-
flict activity in countries with secondary diamonds. This lends support to the theoretical
model by Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2004), illustrating how an increase in the price of a capital
intensive resource leads to a decrease in the wage rate and decreased costs of conflict. This
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Table 2: Basic results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Monthly FE Quarterly FE Yearly FE Monthly FE Monthly FE
Prim. diamonds 0.0126** 0.0424** 0.168** 0.0136** 0.0136**
* diamond price (0.00560) (0.0181) (0.0820) (0.00619) (0.00570)
Second. diamonds -0.0209 -0.0747 -0.242 -0.0161 -0.0222
* diamond price (0.0168) (0.0522) (0.251) (0.0172) (0.0178)
Diamond price -0.148 -0.474 -1.509 -0.142 -0.0685
(0.347) (1.135) (5.181) (0.371) (0.369)
GDP 0.00699 0.0214 0.0657 0.00724 0.00579
(0.0117) (0.0360) (0.147) (0.0127) (0.0127)
Population -0.118 -0.317 -1.676 -0.118 -0.135
(0.204) (0.609) (2.545) (0.190) (0.208)
Exchange rate -3.53e-05 -4.86e-05 -0.00129 -2.97e-05
(0.000579) (0.00180) (0.00745) (0.000748)
CPI -0.000691***
(4.84e-06)
Dependent incl./ Excl. Excl. Excl. Incl. Excl.
excl. protests
Observations 4193 1397 349 4193 4098
# countries 44 44 44 44 44
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
model’s prediction that the price of labour intensive secondary diamonds is negatively re-
lated to conflict is less strongly supported by these results. These results are consistent with
those obtained by Dube and Vargas (2009).
None of the control variables enters regressions (1)-(3) significantly. The coefficient on
diamond price is consistently negative, which is expected if we believe that the diamonds
price to a certain extent reflects the state of the world economy and that conflict is less
likely in more favourable economic conditions. The signs of the coefficients on GDP and
population are surprising (we would expect GDP to be negatively related to conflict and
population size positively), but insignificant. Finally, the exchange rate enters the regression
with a negative coefficient, confirming the presupposition that the same nominal diamond
price would form less of an incentive for conflict in countries with a highly valued exchange
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rate.
The results in the first three columns are not sensitive to changing the dependent vari-
able to include the conflict event type ‘riots and protests’ (column 4). Nor do the results
change when I include the CPI instead of the exchange rate of the local currency (column
5). Similar results are obtained when using quarterly and yearly data (not shown). I do not
use the CPI in the subsequent regressions, because it contains a number of outliers (notably
Zimbabwe), which may be the reason why its coefficient is strongly significant.
A disadvantage of controlling for either the exchange rate of the CPI is that two coun-
tries are dropped: Eritrea and Liberia. The latter seems especially problematic, since it is
associated with both secondary diamonds and conflict. However, results do not change
qualitatively when not including either CPI or exchange rate, allowing both countries back
into the sample.
In Table 3, I experiment with different diamond prices: a diamond price index (available
on a monthly, quarterly and yearly basis) and the value per carat of the exports of signa-
tories to the Kimberly Process (KP), only available quarterly. The interaction term between
primary diamond abundance and diamond price is no longer significant in regressions (1)
and (3), although the sign does not change. Overall however, a picture similar to that in
table 2 emerges: a diamond price rise increases conflict activity in areas with primary dia-
monds, but is unrelated to violence in areas abundant in secondary diamonds, supporting
the Dal Bó and Dal Bó model. The results thus do not seem to be driven solely by the choice
of the indicator for diamond price.
5 Robustness
5.1 Endogeneity of diamond price
One concern with the results in the previous section may be that the diamond price is
endogenous: it may increase as a result of conflict activity in diamond abundant areas as
opposed to violence in these areas increasing because diamonds become more valuable. Al-
though this seems reasonable at first sight, a look at production numbers and the structure
of the diamond market casts doubt on whether diamond-abundant countries in conflict
have a market position such as to meaningfully influence the diamond price. In 2003, four
out of the world’s five largest diamond producers, both by volume4 and by value5 of pro-
duction, have been peaceful over the entire research period (Spar, 2006). Furthermore, it is
universally accepted that the diamond price is to a large extent determined by De Beers,
through its cartel (the CSO). It seems reasonable to believe that supply conditions impact
the diamond price less than the strength of the market position of De Beers (which has re-
4Largest producers by volume (% of world production): Australia (22%), Botswana (22%), DRC (18%), Russia
(13%), South Africa (9%).
5Largest producers by value (% of world production): Botswana (26%), Russia (18%), Canada (15%), South
Africa (11%), Angola (10%).
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Table 3: Different diamond prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Monthly FE Quarterly FE Quarterly FE Yearly FE
Prim. diamonds * 0.0561 0.195* 0.803*
diamond price index (0.0356) (0.104) (0.437)
Second. diamonds * -0.101 -0.439 -1.909
diamond price index (0.183) (0.519) (2.127)
Diamond price index -2.824 -8.411 -30.58
(3.417) (10.43) (43.82)
Prim. diamonds * 0.0154
KP export value p/crt (0.0142)
Second. diamonds * -0.000956
KP export value p/crt (0.0169)
KP export value p/crt -0.00832
(0.538)
Controls include GDP, YES YES YES YES
population and XCR
Observations 4193 1397 1045 349
# Countries 44 44 44 44
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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cently been threatened by diamond extracting companies in Russia, Australia and Canada
operating increasingly independently) (Bergenstock and Maskulka, 2001; Spar, 2006; Yoeli,
2003).
Despite these arguments the reader may not convinced, and believe that supply con-
ditions do influence diamond price. Therefore, I instrument for diamond price using the
lagged export volume of the largest peaceful diamond producers, following a strategy sug-
gested by Dube and Vargas (2009). The assumption here is that the previous period rough
diamond export volume of these peaceful countries is correlated to current international
polished diamond price, but not influenced by current violence in other diamond-abundant
countries. The variables PRIMc×PRICEt, SECc×PRICEt and PRICEt in regression (10) are
treated as endogenous and instrumented for using PRIMc×EXPkt−1, SECc×EXPkt−1 and
EXPkt−1, where EXPkt is the export volume of rough diamonds in carats of large peaceful
exporter k in period t taken from the Kimberly Process Statistics. Because these are only
available quarterly for the period 2004-2009, I only estimate quarterly models and loose a
considerable number of observations. Countries included are Australia, Botswana, Canada,
Russia and South Africa. In case there is a worry that diamond export from Botswana
and South Africa is not exogenous to violence in other African countries (one might for
example suspect that diamonds from conflict countries are smuggled across the border and
are exported as if they were mined in Botswana or South Africa), I also run some regres-
sions including only the export volume of Australia, Canada and Russia in the instruments.
Both combinations of instruments pass standard overidentification tests. Instruments give
acceptable R2’s for the first stage (in the range 0.31 to 0.47) and F-statistics comfortably
over 10 6, giving confidence that the instruments indeed explain part of the variation in the
endogenous variables and suggesting no weak instruments.
Table 4 reports the results of this exercise. Column (1) shows that instrumenting for
diamond price does not meaningfully change the size and sign of the coefficients of in-
terest: the interaction between primary diamond abundance and diamond price is still
positively related to violence, whilst the sign of the coefficient on the interaction term in-
cluding secondary diamond abundance is negative. Compared to the results in table 2
column (2) however, the former looses and the latter gains significance. Although I can
offer no intuitive explanation for the changes in significance level, IV-regression does not
provide convincing evidence to support the concern that the basic results are driven by
reversed causality and in fact strengthens the result on secondary diamonds. The result
that an increase in the price of diamonds leads to a decrease in violence in areas abundant
in secondary diamonds again conforms to the predictions of Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2004).
When using different diamond prices, similar results are obtained using the value of
diamonds taken from the Kimberley Process Statistics (column 3). However, using the
diamond price index produces insignificant coefficients on the variables of interest and
6with the exception of the interaction between primary diamond abundance and diamond price in regression
(2) of table 4
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Table 4: Instrumenting for diamond price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Quarterly IV Quarterly IV Quarterly IV Quarterly IV Quarterly IV
Prim. diamonds * 0.0416 0.0592*
diamond price (0.0272) (0.0334)
Second. diamonds * -0.0485* -0.0800**
diamond price (0.0266) (0.0320)
Diamond price 0.349 0.117
(0.938) (0.902)
Prim. diamonds * -0.270
diamond price index (0.255)
Second. diamonds * -0.0304
diamond price index (0.315)
Diamond price index 4.137
(11.87)
Prim. diamonds * 0.0339 0.0436*
KP export value p/crt (0.0223) (0.0253)
Second. diamonds * -0.0400** -0.0582**
KP export value p/crt (0.0200) (0.0233)
KP export value p/crt 0.237 0.128
(0.842) (0.808)
Instrument: lagged Aus. Botsw. Aus. Botsw. Aus. Botsw. Aus. Can. Aus. Can.
production Can. Rus. SA Can. Rus. SA Can. Rus. SA Rus. Rus.
Controls include GDP, YES YES YES YES YES
population and XCR
Observations 1001 1001 1001 1001 1001
# Countries 44 44 44 44 44
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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an unexpected sign on the interaction between primary diamond abundance and price
(column 2).
In the final two columns of table 4, I use a different set of instruments as to only include
the export of Australia, Canada and Russia. Doing so actually strengthens the results
obtained earlier, with all coefficients of interest now significant and of the expected sign.
This does not support the idea that conflict in African countries is somehow related to
increased diamond exports of Botswana and South Africa. It may even be that violence
in Africa decreases diamond exports of these countries, for example through damaging
infrastructure or, more likely, because customers prefer to buy ‘guaranteed conflict free’
diamonds from elsewhere at times when violence in Africa increases public awareness of
’blood diamonds’. Although this is speculative, it would bias the coefficients in columns
(1)-(3) downwards, explaining the ‘jump’ in significance in the last two columns.
In sum: instrumenting for diamond price does not provide convincing evidence that the
basic results follow from endogeneity of the diamond price to conflict in diamond abundant
areas.
5.2 Cyclical effects and other resources
Another potential concern may be that diamond prices and violence are prone to similar
cyclical effects, biasing the results. It is known that over a quarter of all retail sales of
diamonds take place in December. These spikes in demand may increase diamond price in
specific periods of the year, although not necessarily, given efforts to smooth the diamond
price by the Beers and competition amongst retailers (Yoeli, 2003). If violence in diamond
abundant areas is during the same months (for example for reasons related to climate) this
could possibly create a spurious correlation between violence and diamond price.
To control for this, I include a full set of month and quarter dummies respectively in the
basic monthly and quarterly models. As can be seen in Table 5, columns (1) and (2), this
does not affect the results.
The results may also be biased if the presence of diamonds is correlated to the presence
of other resources and the prices of those resources and the diamond price co-vary. In this
case, part of the increase in violent that has been ascribed to the increasing value of dia-
monds might in reality be due to other resources simultaneously becoming more valuable.
This concern seems especially pressing for primary diamonds, as Clifford suggests that not
only primary diamonds occurrence, but also the occurrence of numerous other resources
is confined to areas that have been geologically stable for the past 1500 years (Archeons)
(Clifford, 1966).
In order to control for this, I include indicators for the abundance of a country in other
resources, interacted with diamond price. I distinguish four categories of other resources:
oil, gas, minerals Clifford identifies as on-Archeon and those he considers off-Archeon.
Data on proven oil and gas reserves in billions of barrels and cubic feet respectively are
drawn from the Oil and Gas Journal. US Geological Survey provides a database of occur-
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Table 5: Controlling for cyclical effects and the presence of other resources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Monthly FE Quarterly FE Monthly FE Quarterly FE Yearly FE
Prim. diamonds * 0.0127** 0.0424** 0.00431 0.0155 0.0450
diamond price (0.00560) (0.0181) (0.00345) (0.0108) (0.0537)
Second. diamonds * -0.0208 -0.0746 -0.0178 -0.0645 -0.182
diamond price (0.0169) (0.0524) (0.0145) (0.0450) (0.217)
Diamond price -0.102 -0.402 -0.297 -0.906 -3.034
(0.370) (1.205) (0.446) (1.451) (6.460)
On-Archeon minerals * 0.00801*** 0.0267*** 0.133***
diamond price (0.00226) (0.00734) (0.0371)
Off-Archeon minerals * 0.00327 0.00817 0.0104
diamond price (0.00497) (0.0165) (0.0766)
Oil reserves * 0.00183 0.00662 0.0243
diamond price (0.00266) (0.00912) (0.0412)
Gas reserves * 0.00463 0.0141 0.0946
diamond price (0.00572) (0.0195) (0.106)
Includes full set of YES YES NO NO NO
month/quarter dummies
Controls include GDP, YES YES YES YES YES
population and XCR
Observations 4193 1397 4193 1397 349
# Countries 44 44 44 44 44
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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rences of a wide range of minerals (Survey, 2005). The total number of deposits in a coun-
try classified as containing one of Clifford’s on-Archeon minerals (gold, platinum, iron,
asbestos or chromium) as ‘major commodity’ is taken to be an indicator for the on-Archeon
mineral abundance. The total number of deposits coded as having some other mineral
(excluding diamonds)7 as ‘major commodity’ forms the indicator for off-Archeon mineral
abundance. I do not distinguish according to development status of the deposit (occurrence
only, prospect producer, producer, post producer), again because resource production may
be endogenous to the model.
The last three columns of Table 5 include interaction terms between these four cate-
gories of resources and diamond price. As can be seen, there is evidence that the earlier
results indeed partially captured the impact of price increases of other resources that oc-
cur in the same areas as diamonds (on-Archeon resources). The interaction term including
on-Archeon minerals is highly significant in all three models and its inclusion causes the
coefficient on primary diamond abundance times diamond price to lose significance and
decrease considerably in size. The signs with which the interactions including primary
and secondary diamonds enter the regression remain unchanged. The terms including the
other minerals enter the regressions positively yet not significantly.
The earlier results are clearly not robust to controlling for the presence of other re-
sources. If a rise in diamond price spurs conflict activity in diamond abundant areas, it
seems to do so only as part of a price increase of numerous resources occurring in the
same areas. This however does not necessarily invalidate the conclusion that the theoretical
model by Dal Bó and Dal Bó fits the data better than that by Garfinkel et al. The pro-
duction processes of gold, platinum, iron, asbestos and chromium can also be considered
capital intensive and the former model would predict that an increase in the price of these
resources is related to more violent activity. None of these resources seem characterized by
particularly weak property rights. The evidence for the wage rate as the channel connecting
resource price and violence still seems more convincing than weak property rights.
5.3 Mechanisms: wage rate versus the ‘prize’ of government
However, Besley and Persson (2008) offer an alternative explanation for the results ob-
tained throughout this paper. An increase in the price of capital intensive resources with
relatively strong property rights may not be connected to increased violence because it de-
presses the wage rate, but because it increases the exogenous revenue the government can
spend at its own discretion, thereby raising the expected returns to fighting over govern-
ment. In the case of diamonds, one would expect primary diamonds to provide a larger
flow of government revenue than secondary diamonds; precisely because property rights
over primary diamonds are better protected is it easier for the government to obtain a por-
7These minerals include: Aluminum, Antimony, Barium, Beryllium, Cobalt, Copper, Gemstone, Graphite,
Lead, Manganese, Mercuty, Nickel, Silver, Tin, Titanium Uranium and Zinc. I exclude deposits containing only
Clay, Limestone, Salt, Stone or Talc-soapstone as major commodity.
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tion of the rents from extraction, whether through taxation, a concession for extraction or
extraction by a state-owned enterprise. This would also explain the result that the diamond
price is connected to increased violence in areas that are abundant in primary diamonds,
but not in those with secondary diamonds. Similarly, we can also expect other capital in-
tensive resources to provide substantial revenue flows to the government, again providing
an alternative explanation for the results in the previous section.
The most straightforward way to test between these two competing mechanisms, wages
versus the prize of obtaining government, would be to control for the wage rate. However,
to the best of my knowledge, reliable data on the wage rate in African countries is not
available. Therefore, I employ a different strategy. If the wage rate is the relevant mech-
anism, we would expect violence in resource abundant areas to increase as a result of an
increase in the price of a capital-intensive resource; unless labour is fully mobile, the wage
rate decreases most in areas where resource production takes place. On the other hand, if
the prize of government is the relevant mechanism, we would expect violence in the capital,
where the government sits, to increase most strongly.
To test this, I construct two new dependent variables: violence in diamond abundant
provinces and violence in the capital. The former is the number of violent events in ACLED
that according to the geographic coordinates took place in a province (or comparable ad-
ministrative unit) that has at least one kimberlite or lamproite deposit that is estimated
to be potentially diamondiferous. The latter is the number of violent events that ACLED
codes as having taken place in the legislative capital of a country.
Table 6, columns (1) and (2) show the results of using these two dependent variables in
the baseline regression. As can be seen, this provides no clear evidence on which mech-
anism is most strongly supported by the data, as the interaction term between primary
diamond and diamond price enters both regressions insignificantly. If anything, it provides
some weak support for the wage mechanism, as the coefficient on the interaction term be-
tween primary diamond abundance and diamond price has the expected sign in regression
(1).
From the previous section, it is clear that the interaction term between primary diamond
abundance and diamond price to a considerable extent captures the effect of price changes
of other resources occurring in the same area. The impact of price change of other capital-
intensive resources with relatively secure property right can equally be explained by both
Dal Bó and Dal Bós and Besley and Persson’s model. To distinguish between both expla-
nations, I also include the four interaction terms between diamond price and abundance of
other resources in the regression run in column (1) and (2) of table 6. The results in column
(3) and (4) show that the interaction term including on Archeon minerals is significantly
and positively related to violence in areas abundant in primary diamonds (and supposedly
other on-Archeon minerals), but not significantly related to violence in the capital. The
coefficient on this interaction term even carries a negative sign in regression (4). Although
by no means conclusive, these results provide suggestive evidence in favour of the wage
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Table 6: Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Monthly FE Monthly FE Monthly FE Monthly FE
Prim. diamonds * 0.00174 -2.00e-05 -1.52e-05 0.000101
diamond price (0.00104) (0.000154) (4.69e-05) (0.000221)
Second. diamonds * -0.000216 -0.000282 -0.000264 -0.000514
diamond price (0.000458) (0.000919) (0.000298) (0.000971)
Diamond price -0.00941 0.00809 -0.00599 -0.00514
(0.0106) (0.0370) (0.00691) (0.0465)
On-Archeon minerals * 0.00202*** -0.000526
diamond price (5.05e-05) (0.000424)
Off-Archeon minerals * -0.000187 0.000981
diamond price (0.000128) (0.000861)
Oil reserves * 2.69e-05 7.61e-05
diamond price (3.90e-05) (0.000214)
Gas reserves * -0.000308 -0.000481
diamond price (0.000204) (0.000675)
Dependent: violent events Diamond Capital Diamond Capital
excl. protests in: provinces provinces
Controls include GDP, YES YES YES YES
population and XCR
# Countries 44 44 44 44
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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rate mechanism, but no support for the prize of government mechanism.
6 Conclusion and policy implications
This paper has investigated whether an increase in diamond prices leads to more violent
activity in African countries that are diamond abundant, and if so through which mecha-
nism. Potentially, a rise in diamond price could increase conflict activity through changing
the wage rate, thereby impacting the opportunity costs of conflict (Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2004)
and/or through weak property rights protection, increasing the expected revenue from
conflict (Garfinkel et al., 2008). The two theoretical models formalizing these mechanisms
make opposite predictions for primary diamonds (characterized by a capital intensive pro-
duction process and relatively secure property rights) and secondary diamonds (labour in-
tensive and relatively insecure property rights). Exploiting this, I interact both primary and
secondary diamond abundance with diamond price and investigate whether these terms
are related to violent activity. This research, based on explicit theoretical models, using
an exogenous indicator for primary and secondary diamond abundance and employing a
country-fixed effects model, intends to avoid some of the pitfalls of earlier work, hopefully
arriving at more consistent and reliable results.
The findings suggest that a rise in diamond price is related to conflict in African coun-
tries that are abundant in primary diamonds, but is unrelated or even negatively related to
violence in countries with secondary diamonds. These results are not driven by the choice
of diamond price data or by the endogeneity of the diamond price to conflict. They are ro-
bust to controlling for cyclical effects, but not to controlling for the presence of other types
of resources. Taken together, there is some evidence that the diamond price is related to
violence in Africa. However, this effect is at least partly due to price increases of other re-
sources present in the same areas. Overall, the data is most consistent with Dal Bó and Dal
Bó’s model, emphasizing the wage rate as a channel connecting resources and violence, and
there is little evidence supporting the model by Garfinkel et al. A competing explanation
for these results might be that resources increase the ‘prize’ of fighting over government
(Besley and Persson, 2008). However, when distinguishing between violence in diamond
abundant areas and violence in the capital, I find suggestive evidence in favour of the wage
rate mechanism.
These results have implications for policies regarding natural resources attempting to
limit conflict. Most importantly, results suggest that any diamond may be a ‘conflict dia-
mond’; also those mined legally. In fact, this paper suggests that primary diamonds, usually
mined by international companies with the consent of the government, are more strongly
related to conflict than secondary diamonds, usually suspected to be ‘blood diamonds’.
Furthermore, there appear to be no special characteristics of diamonds that make them
‘guerilla’s best friend’. Increases in the price of numerous resources with capital-intensive
production processes (or creating a revenue flow for the government) may increase vio-
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lence to an equal or even greater degree. These implications may warrant reconsidering the
effectiveness of various policies.
The most prominent initiative regarding diamonds is the Kimberley Process Certifica-
tion Scheme, attempting to limit trade in diamonds mined by rebels, mostly thought to be
secondary diamonds. In terms of the models presented, it attempts to lower the price of
diamonds obtained through expropriation, decreasing the returns to conflict. This paper
finds no evidence supporting the weak property rights - increased returns to conflict chan-
nel, thereby suggesting that the potential effectiveness of the Kimberley Process is low (even
abstracting from difficulties in the execution of the scheme). The apparent idea behind the
Kimberley process, that easily ‘lootable’ diamonds provide direct returns to rebels, thereby
increasing conflict activity, is not supported by the data in this paper. Within the Dal Bó and
Dal Bó model, decreasing the price of expropriated diamonds would decrease the returns
to the expropriation sector for as far has it targets the diamond industry. However, this
policy would not have any effect on the main channel suggested by this model, the wage
rate, again suggesting limited effectiveness. Finally, the Kimberley Process does not fit in
well with the Besley and Persson model, because diamonds mined with the governments
consent are never conflict diamonds by the definition of the Kimberley process.
More broadly, the specific attention to diamonds the Kimberley Process embodies may
not be productive. If other capital intensive resources are similarly related to conflict, it
may be worth considering policies that address the impact these resources and diamonds
have on violence simultaneously.
One such alternative policy is suggested by Dal Bó and Dal Bó. They show that in the
presence of an expropriation sector, a subsidy to productive labour paid for by a tax on
capital or provision of (unproductive) public employment, can be Pareto improving. In
the context of conflict and weak states, the latter policy seems most feasible. Intuitively,
when a country experiences an increase in the price of a capital intensive good, it may
absorb part of the labour made redundant by a shift to more capital intensive production
in unproductive public employment, thereby mitigating the decrease in wages. Policies
attempting to increase outside options for workers intending to limit the labour pool from
which insurgents can draw recruits have been executed on a limited scale. Hanson et al.
(2009) for example, investigate the impact of the US Commanders Emergency Response
Program (CERP) in Iraq. Using exogenous variation in the rotation of US military units
across Iraqi provinces, they conclude that the program has indeed decreased violent activity.
In sum, this paper suggests that public employment merit consideration as an alternative
to trade bans.
A final type of policy is exemplified by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI). This coalition of governments, companies and civil society attempts to promote
transparency as to how much natural resource extracting companies pay to governments
and what the proceeds from natural resources are spent on. If we believe that one of the
channels connecting natural resource price with conflict is the ‘prize’ of government and
that the initiative limits the extent to which the government can allocate natural resources
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money to its own group (improves the quality of institutions in terms of the Besley and
Persson model), this policy could be effective. However, my tentative attempt to distinguish
between the wage rate and the ‘prize’ of government as a channel provides suggestive
evidence in favour of the former.
References
Bergenstock, D. J. and J. M. Maskulka (2001). The de beers story. are diamonds forever?
Business Horizons 44(3), 37–44.
Besley, T. and T. Persson (2008). The incidence of civil war: theory and evidence.
Blattman, C. and E. Miquel (2009). Civil war. NBER Working Paper Series no. 14801.
Brunnschweiler, C. and E. H. Bulte (2009). Natural resources and violent conflict. resource
abundance, dependence and the onset of civil wars. Oxford Economic Papers 61, 651–674.
Chorlton, L. (2007). Generalized geology of the world: Bedrock domains and major faults
in gis format.
Clifford, T. N. (1966). Tectono-metallogenic units and metallogenic provinces of africa. Earth
and Planetary Science Letters 1, 421–434.
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (1998). On economic causes of civil war. Oxford Economic Pa-
pers 50, 563–573.
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Pa-
pers 56, 563–595.
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2005). Resource rents, governance, and conflict. Journal of Conflict
Resolution 49(4), 625–633.
Collier, P., A. Hoeffler, and D. Rohner (2009). Beyond greed and grievance: Feasibility and
civil war. Oxford Economic Papers 61, 1–27.
Dal Bó, E. and P. Dal Bó (2004). Workers, warriors and criminals. social conflict in general
equilibrium.
Dube, O. and J. Vargas (2009). Commodity price shocks and civil conflict. evidence from
colombia. unpublished working paper.
Elbadawi, I. and N. Sambanis (2002). How much war will we see? explaining the prevalence
of civil war. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(3), 307–334.
Faure, S. (2006). World kimberlites consorem database version 2006-2. consortiom de
recherche en exploration minérale consorem.
29
Fearon, J. and D. Laitin (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency and civil war. American Political Science
Review 97(1), 75–90.
Garfinkel, M., S. Skaperdas, and C. Syropoulos (2008). Globalization and domestic conflict.
Journal of International Economics 76, 269–308.
Global Runoff Data Centre (2007). Major rivers of the world.
Hanson, M., R. Iyengar, and J. Monten (2009). Building peace. the impact of reconstruction
spending on the labor market for insurgents.
Hegre, H. and N. Sambanis (2006). Sensitivity analysis of emperical results on civil war
onset. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(4), 508–535.
Helmstaedt, H. and J. Gurney (1995). Geotectonic controls of primary diamond deposits:
implications for area selection. Journal of Geochemical Exploration 53(1-3), 125–144.
Humphreys, M. (2005). Natural resources, conflict and conflict reslution. uncovering the
mechanisms. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4), 508–537.
Janse, A. and P. A. Sheahan (1995). Catalogue of world wide diamond and kimberlite
occurences: a selective and annotative approach. Journal of Geochemical Exploration 53,
75–111.
Lujala, P., N. P. Gleditsch, and E. Gilmore (2005). A diamond curse? civil war and a lootable
resource. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4), 538–562.
Marshall, T. and R. Baxter-Brown (1995). Basic principles of alluvial diamond exploration.
Journal of Geochemical Exploration 53, 277–292.
Raleigh, C. and H. Hegre (2005). Introducing acled: An armed conflict location and event
dataset.
Rigterink, A. (2010). The wrong suspect. an enquire into the endogeneity of natural re-
sources to civil war.
Ross, M. (2004). How do natural resources influence civil war. evidence from thirteen cases.
International Organization 58(1), 35–67.
Ross, M. (2006). A closer look at oil, diamond and civil war. Annual Review of Political
Science 9, 265–300.
Saldern, M. v. (1992). Forecasting rough diamond prices. a non-linear optimization model
of dominant firm behaviour. Resources Policy, 45–58.
Spar, D. L. (2006). Continuity and change in the international diamond market. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 20(3), 195–208.
30
Survey, U. G. (2005). Mineral Resources Data System. Reston, Virginia: US Geological Survey.
Sutherland, D. G. (1982). The transport and sorting of diamonds by fluvial and marine
processes. Economic Geology 77(7), 1613–1620.
Yoeli, E. (2003). In december, diamonds are forever. empirical evidence of counter-cyclical
pricing in a durable goods market.
31
